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Husserl on Collective Intentionality 
Thomas Szanto  
(Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Literature on Husserl’s theory of empathy and intersubjectivity abounds, especially with re-
gard to how such notions relate to his ‘transcendental solipsism.’ What is little known, how-
ever, is that Husserl, in his later work, offers a highly original theory of collective intentionali-
ty, an issue that is at the forefront of contemporary analytic philosophy of action. In this 
paper, I shall address this hitherto neglected aspect of Husserlian phenomenology and argue 
that Husserl’s contribution, on closer scrutiny, not only stands on an equal footing with con-
temporary accounts but, indeed, also helps to alleviate some of their shortcomings.  
 To be sure, Husserl’s intriguing “social ontology” (Hua XIII, 102) has not gone wholly 
unnoticed.1 Yet, those few examples of existing literature typically have a different focus than 
my own, concentrating, instead, on specific constitutional issues or ontological (sub-)domains 
of social reality, intricate issues that I shall not pursue in great detail here.2 Additionally, with 
even fewer notable exceptions3, there is hardly any work that systematically examines Hus-
serl’s possible contribution to the current debate on collective intentionality. Moreover, both 
Husserl’s preeminent early phenomenological successors and contemporary scholars either 
do not seriously consider his theory of ‘higher order persons’ and ‘common minds’ (Gemeinge-
ist) and their cognate conceptions altogether, or else the verdict is outright dismissive.4 Even-
tually, some contemporary critics regard them simply as relics from a past that notoriously led 
many of Husserl’s contemporaries to give way to the collectivistic aberrations of the social 
and political thought in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Conversely, and somewhat 
ironically, critics have recently claimed that Husserl’s common mind, far from being truly 
anti-individualist, is rather “brainwashed” by Cartesian individualism (Schmid 2000, 2005).  
                                                
1 Evidence suggests that it was, indeed, Husserl who first coined the very term ‘social ontology’ (soziale Ontolo-
gie)—a now well-established research field within current analytic philosophy—in a text from 1910, cf. Salice 
2013. I appreciate help from Thomas Vongehr at the Husserl Archives, KU Leuven, for having verified this in 
the original typescript. 
2 See the respective work on Husserl’s account of ‘higher order persons’ and ‘communal minds’ (Toulemont 
1962; Allen 1978), on specific socio-ontological sub-domains and their foundational structure, such as Husserl’s 
distinction between various types of social collectives (Toulemont 1962, and Perreau 2013), or specific types of 
‘socialities of subordination’ and of ‘equitability’ and Husserl’s theory of the state (Schuhmann 1988), positive 
and/or critical comparisons between Husserl’s and Searle’s social ontology (Thomasson 1997; Johansson 
2003). Theunissen’s (1965/1977) and Strasser’s (1975) contributions, though they first used the term ‘social 
ontology’ (Sozialontologie) in the (German) literature after Husserl, do not deal with Husserl’s social ontology 
proper but, rather, with his account of intersubjectivity and intersubjective monadology; for an early critical 
and, indeed, not very optimistic, account of Husserl’s possible contribution to the philosophy of the social 
sciences more generally, see Neisser 1959; cf. also Uygur 1959, Schmid 2000 and Mulligan 2001, and most 
recently Miettinen 2014. 
3 See Mathiesen 2005; Caminada 2011; Salice 2013, and most detailed Chelstrom 2013. 
4 See esp. the critiques of higher order collectivities in Schütz 1957, 114f., or Kaufmann 1930 and 1944, 163f. 
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 In marked contrast to such critical approaches, I wish to show that Husserl in fact offers 
a rich phenomenological social ontology of various types of collectives. Moreover, I shall 
argue that Husserl provides all conceptual prerequisites for a genuinely novel phenomenolog-
ical account of collective intentionality. Notice that the emphasis here is on prerequisites: 
though I contend that we find all of the building blocks, however scattered, in the work of 
Husserl, in this paper, I endorse a systematic and reconstructive approach rather than a pure-
ly exegetical one. 
 To make my case, my argument proceeds as follows: I start by mapping the terrain with 
an outline of the multi-layered structure of the constitutional process, which Husserl labels 
the ‘socialization’ or ‘communalization’ (Vergemeinschaftung) of individuals. In particular, I shall 
consider the differences in the intentional integration of individuals and collectives in terms 
of intersubjective, social, communal and collective intentionality, respectively (Sec. 1). Against 
a brief survey of the most influential current accounts of collective intentionality (Sec. 2), I 
then concentrate on Husserl’s alternative construal and demonstrate how it entails a robust 
anti-individualism regarding both the form and the subject of we-intentions (Sec. 3). Finally, I 
address two central objections and vindicate the Husserlian account; here I argue that, con-
trary to appearances, Husserl does not fall prey to committing a content/vehicle type of falla-
cy by inferring from the jointness of the contents, or the we-modal feature of collective inten-
tionality, that there is one joint vehicle (one intention) or, worse, some collectively conscious, 
‘bearer-entity’ of such (Sec. 4). I conclude by recapitulating the core merits of the Husserlian 
account of collective intentionality over its dominant, contemporary models.  
 
1. Intersubjective, Social, Communal, and Collective Intentionality: An Outline of  
Husserl’s Intentional Sociology  
 
Husserl’s account of collectives and social entities enters stage at a relatively late phase of the 
foundational process of social reality and, here, in turn, does so as one of the so-called “re-
gional ontologies” (Hua III/1, 19f.).5 This regional ontology, “the systematic ontology of 
social entities and facts” (systematische Ontologie sozialer Gegebenheiten), or “social ontology” for 
short, can be seen as the phenomenological equivalent of sociology, and it is in this sense that 
Husserl employs the concepts “descriptive sociology” (Hua XIII, 102f.) or “intentional soci-
ology” (Hua XXXIX, 389). The “social atoms” (Gilbert 2003) of Husserl’s intentional sociol-
ogy are individuals and their intentional interrelations, i.e., the directedness of intentional acts 
upon one-another.6 It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that the ‘socialization’ of individu-
als, on the one hand, and the constitution of social communities, on the other, for Husserl, 
are correlative, or interdependent constitutional processes. It is not as if there were pre-social 
atoms engaging in social acts and, eventually, constituting social communities. Rather, the 
socialization of individuals—their being constituted as full-fledged social beings who enter-
                                                
5 Presumably, even though this is not fully clear in Husserl, the region to which social reality belongs to, as a 
material ‘sub-region’, is the region of cultural, or spiritual (geistig), intentional achievements, cf., e.g., Hua IV, 
347, 379. 
6 See Hua XIII, 103: “In the social sphere, the basic units of calculation (Grundeinheiten der Rechnung) are individ-
ual human beings and their act-relations upon one-another (Aktbeziehungen aufeinander),” a dictum that, on the 
face of it, resonates with Schütz’ (1932) and Weber’s (1922) methodological solipsism. 
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tain complex social relations—on the one hand, and their communalization—their constitut-
ing social groups and communities—are, as it were, just two constitutional sides of one and 
the same intersubjective process.7 Hence, the phenomenological basis of collectivity and 
community is already at play at the level of those intersubjective processes that imbue the 
most basic sensory—that is to say, affective, or emotional—life of individuals, including their 
drives, or sensory perceptions (Hua VI, 166; XIV, 196ff.; cf. Strasser 1975). This is essentially 
what Husserl means when he claims that an ego “is what it is” only as somebody who bears 
an Other and, indeed, all others, in her very being and that it is “nonsense” that any subject, 
even any “absolute being,” could exist as a solus ipse (Hua XV, 336, 371).  
 What, then, are social entities and, in particular, collectives, and how are they constitut-
ed? Most generally viewed, social entities, for Husserl, are “objectivities of higher-order” (Ob-
jektitäten höherer Stufe; Hua XIII, 101, Fn.; cf. ibid., 99, Fn. 3). Notice that by using the singulare 
tantum concept ‘objectivity’ in the plural, Husserl marks the non-ordinary status of such ‘enti-
ties’: they are neither mere intentional objects nor simply subjects, that is, not subjects at the 
same, constitutionally-foundational level as individual subjects. This, as shall become clear in 
the following (sec. 3–4), is not to say that, for Husserl, collectives were merely objectivities. 
Rather, in specific cases, collectives can well be proper ‘subjectivities’, even if Husserl uses 
the concept ‘subjectivity,’ when attributed to specific sorts of groupings of subjects, in the 
distinctive sense of being of a higher order.8 Consider also that being a higher order entity, be 
it an objectivity or subjectivity, is far from being exclusively reserved to social entities. Hus-
serl equally characterizes the “concrete objective” (individual) “human person” as a “unity of 
higher order” (Hua XIV, 425). Furthermore, from the very start of introducing this concept, 
Husserl makes it very clear that social objectivities are not mere arbitrary “collections” or 
aggregates of individuals but “social unities” in their own right (Hua IV, 196; VIII, 198; XIII, 
99–104; XXVII, 22, 27). 
 Higher order social objectivities are constituted by four interrelated and gradually evolv-
ing constitutional processes that jointly make up what Husserl calls the “intentional implica-
tion” (intentionale Implikation) of one ego in another, or, significantly, the “intentional inter-
twinement of communalization” (Ineinander der Vergemeinschaftung) (Hua VI, 258f.).9 
                                                
7 Similarly, at a higher level of socialization, Husserl points to the “parallel constitution” of communal (higher 
order) subjects and their communal engagements and accomplishments (Hua XIV, 193). 
8 Pace Chelstrom 2013, who claims (without, however, consulting either Hua XIII, XIV, XV or other later texts 
of Husserl) that Husserl “in no way extends a sense of subjectivity to intersubjective groupings of subjects (…) 
and does not speak of them as subjectivities whatsoever” (Chelstrom 2013, 52), a claim that, as a number of 
quotes below will show, is, at least from point of view of the textual evidences, plainly wrong; cf. Szanto 2014b. 
9 See also Hua VI, 252, 259, 417; XV, 371, 377, and Hua Mat VIII, 20, 278. Husserl uses a series of other con-
cepts to refer to this intentional implication, such as “interweaving of intentionality” (ineinandergeflochten; Hua 
VIII, 128), or the “intertwinement of constitution” (Ineinander der Konstitution), “the amazing fashion [in which 
one’s] intentionality reaches into that of the other and vice versa“ (Hua VI, 257f.). Note that the individuals 
who intentionally integrate thusly remain, in fact (reell), ‘separated’. This is the gist of Husserl’s demarcation of 
“intentional intertwinement” (intentionales Ineinander) and “real separateness” (reelles Auseinander) (Hua XV, 371, 
377). Consider, however, that there is a level of analysis and a respective transcendental level of constitution 
wherein intentional interpenetration precedes their separateness such that Husserl, indeed, speaks of the inten-
tional intertwinement as a “metaphysical arch-fact” (metaphysische Urtatsache; Hua XV, 366). Here is a revealing 
passage from the Crisis: “(…) within the vitally flowing intentionality (lebendig strömende Intentionalität) in which 
the life of an ego-subject consists, every other ego is already intentionally implied from the very start by way of 
empathy and the empathy-horizon (Einfühlungshorizont). Within the universal epoché (…), it becomes evident 
that there is no separation of mutual externality at all for souls in their own essential nature. What is a mutual 
separateness (Außeinander) for the natural-mundane attitude of world-life prior to the epoché, because of the 
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Accordingly, and quite unlike the often all-too homogenous account of collective intention-
ality (henceforth: CI) in contemporary social ontology, in Husserl, we may devise four dis-
tinct social types of intentionality: call them intersubjective, social or socio-communicative, communal 
and collective intentionality respectively.10 To be sure, Husserl has no clear taxonomy, let alone 
any precise criteria of individuation of these four types; I suggest, however, that there is 
enough textual and, above all, systematic evidence in his work that Husserl does, in fact, 
properly distinguish between them. The differences between these social forms of intention-
ality are due to differences regarding the underlying constitutional processes of socializa-
tion/communalization, the robustness of intentional integration and the subject, and the con-
tent and the object of the respective intentional engagements. More precisely, the 
constitutional moments of the complex foundational process of socialization and communal-
ization of individuals are as follows: 1.) (individual and collective) empathy; 2.) the constitu-
tion of a “transcendental We” and the correlative social lifeworld and objectivity 3.) explicit 
socio-communicative acts and joint attention; 3.); and, finally, 4.) various forms of CI proper. 
In order to get a firm grip on Husserl’s account of CI, it is the fine-grained structure of this 
multi-dimensional constitutional process of communalization to which we must now turn our 
attention. 
 (1) On the most basic level of the constitution of persons qua atoms of social life, we 
have empathy (Einfühlung). Empathy, for Husserl, roughly, is an irreducible intentional experi-
ence of another subject (Fremderfahrung), one that consists in encountering another animate 
body, its recognition as another ‘lived body’ (Leib), and, eventually, its recognition as another 
subject or ego (alter ego) with its own conscious intentional life. This process of recognition 
takes its cue from the bodily manifestations and verbal expression (gestures, mimics, explicit 
communication, etc.) of the Other and, essentially, happens by means of the so-called “ana-
logical appresentation,” analogous to the “re-presentation” (Vergegenwärtigung) of one’s own 
past experiences, and “associative coupling” or “pairing” (Paarung) of the respective experi-
ences (Hua I, 138ff.). What is crucial to note for present purposes is that empathy typically 
amounts to dyadic, I-Thou relations (Ich-Du-Beziehungen). Accordingly, intersubjective, empa-
thy-based intentionality entails Other-directed intentional acts, whose subject is an individual 
and whose object, the target of empathy, includes one or more other subjects and their re-
spective intentional properties.11  
 (2) The second central moment in the constitution of communal life is the constitution 
of the universally shared lifeworld and its subjective correlate, the “transcendental We” (Hua 
I, 137). I propose to subsume this highly complex constitutional process under the heading of 
                                                                                                                                                   
localization of souls in living bodies, is transformed in the epoché into a pure, intentional interweaving (wechsel-
seitiges intentionales Ineinander).” (Hua VI, 259); see also the quote from Hua XV, 335 below (sec. 4). 
10 Here, I am indebted to De Vecchi 2011 and 2014, who similarly distinguishes “intersubjective,” “social,” and 
“collective intentionality,” as well as further types, some of which are also to be found in Husserl’s phenome-
nology of sociality, including, e.g., affective (as distinct from cognitive or practical), intersubjective and collec-
tive intentionality (cf., e.g., Hua XIV, 196ff. and Husserl 1923); see also Schmid 2009.  
11 This is not to say that empathy for Husserl (or for Stein 1917) must necessarily target single individuals only, 
or that there cannot indeed be such as collective empathy, whose target is not an individual but a collective of 
individuals or a community. Notice that, in such social or collective forms of empathy, however, the empathiz-
er aims at understanding, not so much the alleged experiences of collectives or communities, as in the individu-
al case, but, rather, the collective’s “social functions,” values, etc. (cf. Hua IV, 200; VIII, 137; XIII, 99). For 
more on the possibility of such collective forms of empathy, esp. in Stein, cf. Szanto forthcoming b. 
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‘communal intentionality’.12 What happens here, roughly, is, above and beyond empathy’s I-
Thou-synthesis/pairing and social act’s I-Thou-relations (see below), a specific “We-
synthesis” (Wir-Synthesis), thereby constituting a “general We” (allgemeines Wir). The objective 
intentional correlate of this We is “the intersubjectively identical lifeworld-for-all” (Hua VI, 
175f., cf. 163ff.). The important point here is that there is an “interpersonal intentionality” 
that, by way of a “synthesis of individuals,” not only establishes a “social plural” (soziales Plu-
ral), but, at the same time, a founded and yet “intrinsic unity” (innere gestiftete Einheit) (Hua 
VIII, 198). This internally-synthesized social plural, being a transcendental (inter-)subjectivity, 
has (just as their members have) the individual egos, a proper “intersubjective sphere of own-
ness” (Hua I, 137). Moreover, this transcendental We has its own constitutive function, spe-
cifically, the constitution of an objective world, and, ultimately, of objectivity. As such, i.e. as 
‘constitutive intersubjectivity’ (Zahavi 2001, 115), it is a kind of transcendental primitive in 
the ontology of social reality. Now, the subjects of such communal intentionality are still in-
dividuals. However, as members of the transcendental We, as inhabitants of the social life-
world, their intentional experiences are such that they are impregnated, as it were, by a ‘we-
mode’. At bottom, this means the sharing of a first-person plural perspective onto the com-
mon lifeworld, and it is precisely in this sense that Husserl speaks of a “nos cogitamus” (Hua 
VIII, 316).13 Husserl spells out this transcendental commonality of experiencing in terms of 
the ‘typicality’ and ‘habituality’ of apperceiving the common lifeworld. The commonality in-
cludes both types of intentional content, as well as types of experiential modes, or the form 
of experiences. For example, all of us have certain X-type-perceptions and share certain be-
liefs based on such X-type-perception (cf. Chelstrom 2013, 171). 
 (3a) Next, we have explicit and reciprocal socio-communicative acts (kommunikative sozi-
ale Akte; Akte der sozialen Wechselbeziehung; Hua I, 159; IV, 194; XIII, 98ff.; XIV, 166ff.), which 
Husserl also labels “social I-Thou-acts and We-acts” (soziale Ich-Du-Akte und Wir-Akte; VIII, 
137; cf. XV, 19). Here, one is explicitly addressing others via notifications, acknowledgments 
(Kenntnisnahme), reports (Mitteilung), etc., and takes specific normative stances towards them. 
Paradigmatic examples of such “social acts” are promises, encouragements, requests, orders, 
indications, suggestions, or agreements. Similarly with empathy, the subjects of social acts are 
individuals, and they also have an Other-directed character in that they are directly addressed 
to one or more other subjects, or even a collection of individuals (e.g., I may order a group to 
do something). Not only are they similar in this respect, but social acts also have their phe-
nomenological basis in empathy. However, it is important not to confuse the two social 
stances (cf. Hua XIII, 98ff.). One significant difference between social acts and empathy con-
cerns reciprocity. Empathy, though it can well be reciprocal and even assume collective 
forms, is not necessarily reciprocal. This is quite unlike socio-communicative acts, which 
Husserl frequently characterizes as reciprocal or mutual social relations (soziale Akte der Wech-
selbeziehung). Touching on this, it is noteworthy that Husserl occasionally distinguishes “recip-
                                                
12 Cf. Hua XIV, 74, 94, 99, 173, 196ff.; XV, 331ff.; XXXIX, 260ff., 385ff., 491; Mat VIII, 178ff., 369ff., 430ff. 
13 Carr puts this point succinctly: “The establishment of the we in common perception is the simplest form of 
what Husserl calls the Vergemeinschaftung der Monaden: when two subjects confront one another and stand in 
relation to the same objects they form, to that extent, a rudimentary community that can itself be considered as 
performing an act (cogitamus) through ‘its’ diverse (and in this case simultaneous) presentations.” (Carr 1973, 30) 
See also Carr 1986 and, critical of Carr’s ingenious cogitamus-conception, Chelstrom 2013, chap. 3, as well as 
Zahavi (forthcoming); cf. also Schmid 2009, 34, and the useful discussion in Miettinen 2014. 
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rocal” from “unilateral” or “one-sided” empathy (wechselseitige and einseitige Einfühlung; Hua 
XIV, 133, 135, cf. also ibid., 198f. and XIII, 98). Furthermore, social acts are founded upon 
distinctively communicative acts; as such, they build the foundational basis of agreements, 
collective acceptances, and, eventually, collective intentionality proper, though, again, they 
must be distinguished from the latter. Importantly—and, here, we have another difference to 
empathy—part and parcel of what makes such communicative acts distinctly social acts is that 
they have a specific normative content. In order for a social act to be successful, a subject’s 
intentional act ought to be acknowledged by another subject and, possibly, the latter ought to 
be assisted in the fulfilment of the former (cf. Hua XIII, 98; XIV, 166f.).  
 (3b) Interestingly, in this connection, Husserl refers to something akin to what is cur-
rently a much-discussed phenomenon: joint attention (cf. Eilan et al. 2005). Thus, somebody 
may ‘guide’ the attention of another by signalling, pointing, or, guiding in an even more im-
plicit way, e.g., by throwing a piece of wood in her direction. The other might then apper-
ceive my action as expressing my intention to communicate something. Here, a shared back-
ground of understanding each other’s communicative intention constitutes the attentional 
link (cf. Hua XIV, 167f.). 
 Consider that the foundational relations holding between these levels of sociality not-
withstanding, there are various interrelations and interpenetrations between them. For in-
stance, though empathy builds the basis of all other constitutional layers of social reality, em-
pathy can be rightly said to be, in turn, an instance of the typicality of shared experiencing or, 
more generally, the common lifeworld (cf. Chelstrom 2013, 172). Similarly, social acts are 
performed against the background and are instance of the shared lifeworld, but also co-
constitute what Husserl calls the universal “communicative plurality/community” of subjects 
(kommunizierende Vielheit/Gemeinschaft; Hua XIV, 74, 173, 197ff.). In this respect, the relations 
between (1), (2) and (3) as well as, incidentally, (4), should be construed not so much in the 
order of some foundational hierarchy but, rather, as interdependent moments of a complex 
constitutional process. 
 What Husserl has established up to this point is that the essentially social lifeworld 
comprises not only socialized individuals and intersubjective I-Though relations, but, also, 
social pluralities. Moreover, the lifeworld, for Husserl, is but the shared horizon of the uni-
versal community of subjects. Schematically, the three processes of socialization and com-
munalization discussed so far can be epitomized thusly: no individual person without another 
individual and, eventually, without a community of persons; no objectivity of experiences 
without the transcendental We; and no proper social relations without explicit socio-
communicative acts. 
 (4) Having said this, it is crucial to distinguish from empathy, from the domain of the 
transcendental We, as well as from social acts the more specific socio-ontological domain that 
comprises those higher order communities that have a proper ‘intentional life’, or even a 
‘mind of their own’ (Pettit 2003; List/Pettit 2011). Only here do we reach the level of CI. CI 
presupposes, but significantly differs from, intersubjective, social, and communal intentionali-
ty, to wit, regarding its subject, object and content.  
 On the face of it, the general structure of integration here is rather similar to social acts, 
in that the intention of one or more individuals functions as a motivational property, or a 
motif (Motiv) for another individual’s intentions (Hua XIII, 104, XIV, 169). However, in con-
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trast to typically asymmetrical social acts, CI is based on mutual interest. Thus, the ‘interlock-
ing’ of the motivational properties of one’s intention into another’s is occasioned both be-
cause of, and with a view to, a collective goal (the intentional object), eventually resulting in a 
collaborative endeavour to bring about that goal. Moreover, above and beyond the mere so-
cio-communicative processes involved in social acts, we chiefly have practical-intentional, 
volitional and agential components involved here. Consider further that the constitutional 
relation is, just as in the case of social acts, not a one-way dependence but, rather, a correla-
tion. Accordingly, the intentional properties of “practical communities of will” and, even 
more so, of higher order persons, may have reciprocal, or feedback effects on the individuals 
constituting of such. This typically happens through their “sedimentation” in the experiences 
and attitudes of the individuals involved via habits, tradition, or culture (e.g., Hua XIV, 222–
232).14 
 To get a more precise idea of Husserl’s view on the structure of CI proper, it is worth-
while to quote a longer passage, in which, as I contend, he anticipates in nuce much of con-
temporary analytic accounts.  
 
“A community of will, consent (Einverständnis) may then also be mutual, resulting in a mutual 
agreement (wechselseitige Vereinbarung). I satisfy your desire if you satisfy mine (…). Furthermore: 
We both want something to happen, we ‘jointly’ (‘gemeinsam’) take a decision, I do my respective 
part, you do yours. Etc. S1 and S2 want G, but not each of them separately, for their own sake, 
but S1 wants G as something that is equally wanted by S2, the will of S2 is part of what is willed 
by S1 (der Wille des S2 gehört mit zum Gewollten des S1) and conversely. The fact that S1 realizes D1 
and S2 D2 is, in turn, comprised in the volitions of both, comprised as ‘means’ (in a broader 
sense), or, as part of what belongs to the realization (als zur Realisierung gehörig), and, originally, 
to the intention (Absicht).” (Hua XIV, 170)15 
 
To those familiar with the analytic literature on CI, this and other similar passages (cf. sec. 3) 
will certainly read somewhat untidily. So, what, exactly, is Husserl telling us here? 
 To be sure, given the central conceptual distinctions underlying analytic accounts of 
CI16, specifically, as to where one ought to ‘tie in’ the collectivity – a.) in the content or object, 
b.) the mode, or c.) the subject of collective intentions – one has a hard time with assessing 
Husserl. However, this is not so much due to a failure of having understood clearly the points 
at issue but, rather, to his very conception of collectivity and collective intentionality. Indeed, 
as I shall argue below (sec. 3), collectivity, for Husserl, is holistically built into the intentional 
content, object, and the mode, as well as the ab ovo communalized subjects, or the higher or-
der collective subject of CI.17 Hence, as we shall see, Husserl not only circumvents any charge 
of atomism or solipsism, but, moreover, he eventually avoids the pitfalls of circularity in ex-
                                                
14 Husserl even suggests that contracts and (explicit) agreements may have such sedimentation of “habitualized 
validity” (habituelle Geltung), which normatively binds the respective parties in meeting and fulfilling the com-
mitment, cf. Hua Mat VIII, 334. For Husserl, the clearest and strongest form of a ‘habitualized identification’ 
of the affective/sensate and volitional subjectivity (habituelle Identifikation der Gemüts- und Willenssubjektivität), 
without explicit agreement or any kind of “concessions” are “spiritual love” and “love communities” (geistige 
Liebe, Liebesgemeinschaft) (Husserl 1923, 209). On the concept of “habitual volitional directedness” (habituelle 
Willensrichtungen), see Hua XXXIX, 389, on ‘sedimentation’, esp. Hua XLII, 39ff., 62ff.; cf. also Moran 2011. 
15 Similar descriptions can be found at a number of places in Husserl’s research manuscripts; for other telling 
passages, see, e.g., Hua XXXIX, 389 or Husserl 1923, 209. 
16 For excellent overview articles, see Tollefsen 2004, Roth 2011 and Schweikard/Schmid 2013.  
17 For a similar line of interpretation, see Caminada 2011, 68f. 
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plaining the jointness of collective intentions with reference to already-collective intentional 
engagements, a charge that has typically been directed against ‘collective acceptance’ or ‘joint 
commitment’ accounts of CI (cf. Tollefsen 2002, 2004; Schmid 2005; 2009). Before lending 
support to this interpretation, however, we have to get an initial understanding of the most 
compelling alternatives currently at our disposal.  
 
2. Current Accounts of Collective Intentionality  
  
In contemporary analytic theory of action, there is a widespread consensus that there are in-
trinsically collective intentions, such that they are irreducible to a mere summation or aggre-
gation of individual intentions with the same intentional content or object. Within this non-
summative camp, one finds roughly four different models of explanation of CI:  
 (1) The first aims at explaining the sharedness of intentions in collectivity intentionality 
in terms of collective intentional contents. According to this model, joint agency is constitut-
ed by “appropriately interlocking” or “meshing” individual intentions with an aim toward a 
shared goal and common knowledge thereof. A key proponent of this view is Michael Brat-
man (1992, 1993, 1997). Bratman holds that two subjects A and B jointly intend to J, iff (i.) A 
and B respectively have an intention that we J, (ii.) A and B intend to J “in accordance with” and 
“because of” (i.), A and B coordinate and “mesh” their “interdependent,” “mutually respon-
sive” and “mutually supportive” but individual “subplans” concerning their J-ing appropriate-
ly and in order to bring about a shared goal (in short, each does her part in J-ing), and, (iii.) A 
and B have common knowledge of (i.) and (ii.). This is a so-called distributive or individualis-
tic account of shared intention. For, although the intentions bear reference to joint action and 
shared goals in the propositional content of the intentions (‘I intend that we J’), the intentions 
remain distributed across the respective agents. Although there is an irreducibly collective 
content in each and every individual’s intention, there is, as Bratman explicitly points out 
(1993, 123), no sharedness, or no shared intention, let alone some “fused” agent or volition, 
apart from the fact that individuals’ intentions are appropriately interrelated (via (i.)-(iii.)). 
 (2) The second, equally distributive (and equally non-summative) CI-model is owed to a 
series of arguments advanced most prominently by Searle (1990, 1995, 2010) and Tuomela 
(2007). Although their accounts differ in detail,18 they both share the assumption that collec-
tivity must be (irreducibly) built into the very (we-)mode (Tuomela 2007), or, as Searle puts it, 
into the “sense of collectivity,” the “sense of doing, (wanting, believing, etc.) something togeth-
er” (Searle 1995, 24f.). According to this account, the very mode of my J-ing is constitutively 
affected by the fact that my J-ing is part of our J-ing. This shift from the content to the mode 
of CI is best brought out by contrasting Bratman’s collective intentions, which supervene on 
the interlocking of intentions of the form ‘I intend that we J’ and ‘You intend that we J’, etc., 
with Searle’s ‘we-intentions’ or Tuomela’s ‘we-mode’ intentions, where collectivity is consti-
tuted by intentions of the form ‘(I) we-intend that we J’ and ‘(You) we-intend that we J’, and 
where such intentions, respectively, cause each of us to perform actions with view to a shared 
                                                
18 For some of their disagreements, see, e.g., Searle 1990 vs. Tuomela/Miller 1988 and Tuomela 1995; cf. also 
Tuomela 2013, 83ff.; however, Tuomela has suggested that Searle’s view is well amenable to his own ‘we-mode’ 
account (Tuomela 2007, 100). Importantly, Tuomela (2007, 2013), unlike Searle, explicitly allows for groups as 
such to have we-intentions (as well as group beliefs, values, etc.), i.e., full-fledged group intentionality. 
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goal.19 As Searle points out, a chief reason for this shift from the content to the mode is that 
it accounts for the fact that, in cooperative activities, typically, one’s intentions have a differ-
ent content than those of another agent, and, yet, they can well be said to partake in the same 
intentional activity. For example, I intend to play the piano, and you intend to play the violin; 
at the same time, precisely by each of us intending our own (different) actions, we may intend 
to play a duet together (Searle 2010, 44f.). All we need here is a mutual understanding that we 
are partaking precisely in a joint activity, whereby each of us is committed to do her part in 
bringing about the shared goal. Similarly, Tuomela holds that joint intentions constitutively 
entail that each participant “we-intends to bring about” or “sees to it” that an action or state 
is brought about jointly with other agents (Tuomela 2005, 330).  
 (3) In contrast, according to Gilbert’s non-summative and non-distributive “plural sub-
ject” account, two or more individuals share an intention to J if and only if they are “jointly 
committed” to intend as a single body to J (Gilbert 1989, 2003, 2006, 2009). As the label already 
indicates, this account lays stress on the subject of CI. More precisely, according to Gilbert’s 
view, joint commitments constitute a plural subject, who is the proper subject, if not the 
‘bearer’ (the “single body”) of the collective intention. Crucial for Gilbert’s proposal is the 
technical concept of joint commitments, which is the glue of CI, binding individual subjects 
to form a plural subject. In terms of a telling metaphor, what individuals do when they jointly 
commit themselves is “pooling their wills” (Gilbert 1989, 196f.). Importantly, Not only do 
joint commitments contrast with “personal commitments” (possibly to a shared goal), but, 
moreover, they are also neither a “conjunction” nor a “concatenation” thereof. Instead, they 
are “in an important sense simple or singular” (Gilbert 2006, 8). Joint commitments imply 
that the parties see to it “as far as possible to emulate, by virtue of the actions of each, a sin-
gle body that intends to do the thing in question” (Gilbert 2009, 180). Precisely by doing so, 
the parties are jointly committed to the intentional action such that, unlike in the case of per-
sonal commitments, none of the parties can suspend the obligation thus created separately, 
not even the aggregate of the respective subjects, each taken separately. 
 (4) Lastly, in opposition to all three previous accounts and primarily directed against 
Searle’s methodological solipsistic and internalist framework (cf. Meijers 2003; Schmid 2003), 
there are those ‘relational’ accounts of CI that stress the importance of normative (Meijers 
2003) or non-normative, conative and affective (Schmid 2005, 2009) social interrelations be-
tween individuals. Relationists aim to counter the imminent charge of circularity, addressed to 
those who explain CI by some mechanism (essentially collective acceptances à la Tuomela, or 
joint commitments à la Gilbert) that presupposes individuals as already partaking in some joint 
activity. Consequently, some have argued that if CI presupposes collective acceptance or joint 
commitments, then these, in turn, cannot be explained by reference to isolated, solipsistic 
individuals but, rather, must make reference to certain (normative) relations (of obligations, 
rights to corrections, etc.) that hold between them. CI, according to this view, are not states 
of individuals tout court, but “states of related individuals” (Meijers 2003, 181). As Schmid puts 
it in a yet more radically relational vein: “Collective intentions are not intentions of the kind 
anybody has – not single individuals, and not some super-agent. For collective intentionality is 
not subjective. It is relational. Collective intentionality is an intentionality which people share.” 
(Schmid 2009, 44) In other words, there is no collective intentionality without individuals 
                                                
19 For an illuminating critical elaboration of the contrast between Bratman and Searle, see Schmid 2005, 230ff. 
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who we-intend (pace Bratman), but we-intentions are only what they are when individuals 
relate to another accordingly (pace Searle); indeed, they are nothing but relatedness (cf. Schmid 
2005, 239f.).  
 
3. Husserl’s Alternative Account 
 
Where does Husserl stand in this quadripartite conceptual landscape? As previously stated, I 
contend that Husserl’s account of collective—let alone intersubjective, social or communal—
intentionality cannot be easily harmonized with any of these aforementioned accounts; if any-
thing, it is, pace Schmid (2005), closest to the radical relationalists. Moreover, the commonality 
involved in practical and theoretical CI, for Husserl, is irreducible to the conjunction of 
(propositional) content, (we-)mode, and (plural) subject, nor is it constituted by either of 
them separately. Rather, it is a constitutional result of the above outlined, multi-layered pro-
cess of communalization, beginning with empathy, advancing to the sharing of a we-
perspective and the corresponding constitution of a common lifeworld, and concluding with 
higher order persons. It is in this sense that subjects of CI, phenomenologically viewed, are ab 
ovo communalized, that they are subjects who always already stand in social relations to one 
another. Note, again, that this interpretation of Husserl’s CI-model, for what its worth, owes 
its credence, not to the textual evidence of Husserl’s work on the issue of CI alone, but, ra-
ther, to his systematic account of the foundational structure and the gradually evolving layers 
of social reality as a whole. 
 Given the presentation of the four main types of theories of CI above (sec. 2), howev-
er, it should be clear that Husserl’s own account resonates with a number of insights among 
each of them. For example, Husserl seems to agree with Bratman in that part of the (proposi-
tional) content of the parties’ intentions or volitions is the shared intention, or the jointly in-
tended, volitional goal and, also, that the parties rely on the intentional subplans of each other 
(Hua XXXIX, 387) to “motivate” one another’s intentions (Hua XIV, 171) and, eventually, 
play their own respective parts in bringing about the shared goal. Compare, again, the quote 
above from Husserl: “I do my respective part, you do yours (…) that S1 realizes D1 and S2 D2 is (…) 
comprised in the volitions of both, comprised as ‘means’ (…)”, to what Bratman says about “shared 
cooperative activity” (SCA): “(…) for our J-ing to be SCA I must intend that we J in part be-
cause of your intention that we J and its subplans“, wherein this requires, among other crite-
ria (such as commitment to mutual support), that “each agent treat[s] the relevant infor-
mations of the other as ends-providing for herself” (Bratman 1992, 100, 102). Moreover, 
according to what is an admittedly charitable reading, even on the terminological level, there 
is much concordance when Husserl speaks of the “interweaving” or “meshing” of interests 
and volitions (Willens-/Interessensverflechtung; Hua XIV, 170; XXXIX, 386) or of “intentional 
intertwinement,” and Bratman, too, of the “meshing” or “interlocking” of intentions. But, 
surely, and here ends the comparison with Bratman, if such interlocking is successful, then, 
for Husserl, the result is a genuine we-intention (à la Searle), where the jointness is built into 
the very mode20 of individuals’ intentions. Furthermore, if the integration is more robust than 
                                                
20 Here, it should be noted that the concept of ‘(we-)mode’ in the present context is used in a broader sense 
than Husserl does so when he speaks of modes of conscious experiences (Bewusstseinsmodus; cf. Hua X, 79, 
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a mere ad-hoc-collaboration (of the SCA-sort), then we have higher-order collectives, which 
have, rather than only Bratman’s shared intentional contents and goals, full-fledged we-mode 
group intentions (à la Tuomela). 
 There are also a number of places where Husserl closely approximates Gilbert’s plural 
subject account and seems, generally, to come closer to a joint commitment and/or a collec-
tive acceptance view. Consequently, in a successful meshing of intentions, Husserl stresses 
the prevalence of a proper plural subject of volition, the so-called “community of will,” and 
its (normative) role in enabling, or enacting, collective agreements over ‘personal’ intentions 
and goals. Above and beyond the aforementioned ones, here is another telling passage in 
support of this view: 
 
“Associations (Vereine), communities of will (Willensgemeinschaften). The goal of the association, 
being the goal aimed at by all, ‘communally’ intended (‘gemeinschaftlich’ erstrebt). Agreement. Each 
assuming ‘her part’ in realizing it. An agreement upon a goal to be achieved jointly, however, is 
not an association. (…) An association becomes a sort of subject of volition (eine Art Willenssub-
jekt), and the member of the association is commissioned (beauftragt), or acts without a commis-
sion by herself, but not as a private person, but as a member in the spirit (im Sinne) of the asso-
ciation. The appropriately directed will is will as a member. The original will is streaming into 
the center, as ‘will of the association’ (‘Vereinswille’): on becoming a member of the association, 
and also afterwards, it is at the same time an individual volition (Individualwille), yet emerging 
from that center, and that means, not merely a private volition but a member-volition (Mit-
gliedswille).” (Hua XIII, 108).  
 
Notice, however, the following crucial difference to Gilbert or any collective commitment or 
agreement view, a difference that also allows Husserl to parry objections of circularity of the 
sort mentioned above:21 Thus, quite unlike current proposals, at a number of places, Husserl 
submits that collective acceptance, agreement, or commitment typically is a result and not, in 
any substantial sense, a constituent of collective or group-intentionality (cf. Caminada 2011, 68). 
We find the most explicit formulations of this view in those two longer quotes cited above 
(Hua XIV, 170; XIII, 108), where Husserl says that a community of will may “result in mutual 
agreement,” or that such an agreement does not, eo ipso, amount to an association. According-
ly, Husserl declares that “not all communal achievements (Gemeinschaftsleistungen) emerge from 
agreements” (Hua Mat VIII, 334; cf. also XXXIX, 385ff.). Moreover, mutual or collective 
agreements, for Husserl, even if in place, are not necessarily made explicit. Indeed, typically, 
agreements are made against a more general yet not any less fundamental background of 
commonality. Thus, Husserl localizes agreements (Vereinbarungen) within the “unitary field of 
dissent and possibilities of consent (Vermöglichkeiten der Einwilligung),” or “a horizon of una-
nimity” (Horizont der Einstimmigkeit) (Hua XXXIX, 396; cf. also 385ff.). 
                                                                                                                                                   
367f.; Hua XXIII, 407; Hua Mat VIII, 270), essentially referring to the so-called ‘qualitative’ intentional and/or 
doxastic modes such as belief, doubt, memory, re-presentation, and/or imagination. 
21 For another line of phenomenological criticism of Gilbert’s plural subject account, according to which indi-
viduals may – phenomenally – well have shared experiences without, in fact, there being a plural subject or a 
(reciprocal) joint commitment satisfying the respective individual’s experiences, see Chelstrom 2013, 147–155. 
Though I find Chelstrom’s criticism convincing (see also Szanto 2014b) here, I am not, however, dealing with 
the subjective phenomenology of shared experiences. Cf., critically of Gilbert from a phenomenological point of 
view also Schmid 2005 and 2009.  
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 Finally, as to the relational accounts, in an important sense, Husserl concurs with such 
accounts. For Husserl, too, holds that some background of commonality or sharedness must 
be always already presupposed in order for individuals to engage in CI in the first place, and 
that this is constituted, not by pre-social individuals, but, rather, by intrinsically social rela-
tions among such individuals. 
 Given this reassessment of Husserl against the contemporary proposals, I propose the 
following systematic reading of his view on CI:  
  
 Two or more subjects S1, S2 … Sn jointly intend to J if 
 
(1) the ‘intentional lives’ of S1, S2 … Sn are communalized via mechanisms of inten-
tional implication (i.e., essentially via empathy, shared typicalities and habitualities 
of experiencing, or the commonality of a lifeworld and, possibly, via socio-
communicative acts); 
(2) (some of) S1’s, S2’s … Sn’s intentional properties (perceptions, cognitions, affec-
tions, volitions, etc.) motivate each other’s own; 
(3) S1’s, S2’s … Sn’s individual intentions to J are intentional part and parcel of each 
others intentions, such that it is an intrinsic part of the intentional content of S1’s 
intention that there is a goal shared by S2, (SG), and that S1 is intending SG as it is 
intended by S2 (and the same goes for Sn); 
(4) possibly, there is an explicit collective agreement or a joint commitment regarding 
SG, and/or to (5), and/or a joint decision to J; 
(5) S1, S2 … Sn assume each its own part in bringing about SG. 
 
Consider that, in the central clause (3), ‘part and parcel’ not only refers to the sharedness of 
intentional contents and modes, but also means, as Husserl indicates in the quoted passage, in 
a still stronger sense and in terms of something close to ‘conditions of fulfilment’, that S2’s 
intention “belongs [as ‘means’ (in a broader sense)] to the very realization” (Hua XIV, 170) of 
S1’s intention. 
 The upshot, then, is this: Collectivity, or jointness in collective intentions, for Husserl, 
is constituted by the appropriate intentional integration of the intentional, goal-directed, 
normative, volitional and practical properties of the mental life of always and already socialized 
and communalized individuals. The integration, in turn, is brought about, not so much through 
mere collective agreement (as for Tuomela), nor by the mere interlocking of individual sub-
plans in attaining a shared goal (as for Bratman), but, rather, by the very intention through 
which one subject functionally enters, or is realized in, the intentional content of another sub-
ject as joint ‘means’ to attain a shared goal. The shared goal, the object correlate of the re-
spective intentions, is, thus, ‘represented’, as one might phrase it in Searlean terms, as the 
same intentional content in both intentions. Hence, the result is a genuinely we-mode voli-
tional act. 
 Now, if this integration is robust enough, then what is thus constituted is a so-called 
practical community of will, or a fully-fledged higher order person (HOP). Moreover, if this 
is the case, then HOPs—above and beyond the collective intentionality of jointly engaged indi-
viduals—have a we-mode group intention to G. Consequently, in such cases (and only in such 
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cases, mind you), the communalization does not stop at (5), but, instead, assumes more ro-
bust forms. What we have, then, is this:  
 
(6) Founded on (1)–(5), and quite possibly on customarily distributed shared inten-
tional functions (via habits, traditions, culture, etc.), shared values, etc., and a more 
or less explicit integration of intentions, volitions, values and interests of S1, S2 … 
Sn (essentially as in (4)), there is a diachronically-robust sphere of commonality and 
shared ‘intentional action patterns’ vis-à-vis SG.  
(7) Founded on (6), and on the ‘integrate’22 of the intentions of the members S1 and S2 
… Sn, there is a HOP, who is the proper subject of collective intentionality. 
(8) HOP intends to G. 
 
Now, provided this view, we arrive at Husserl’s robust anti-individualism, a thesis that pertains 
less to the intentional nature of individuals or the ontological nature of social entities and 
more to the formal structure and the subject of collective intentionality. More specifically, 
consider two related but distinct variants of anti-individualism, both of which, I contend, 
Husserl, in fact, endorses: 
 
Formal Anti-Individualism: There are intentional states and (practical) intentions that have 
a first-person plural form or mode (i.e., we-intentions, or we-mode intentions). 
 
Subjective Anti-Individualism: We-(mode-)intentions possibly, to wit, under suitable (socio-
practical) integration of their respective subjects, have a supra-individual (higher order) 
subject of intention.23 
 
Thus, in the first type of anti-individualism, the issue is whether the form or mode of collec-
tive intentions (we-mode or we-intentions) is reducible to a set or aggregation of reciprocal ‘I-
intentions.’ The second concerns the question of whether the class of possible ‘bearer-
subjects’ of intentions is restricted to individuals or, rather, may range over collectives. While 
most current authors would advocate the weaker, formal anti-individualism (Searle, Tuomela, 
and, obviously, Gilbert, although with the notable exception of Bratman, against whom it is 
mainly directed), the latter, stronger, subject anti-individualism seems deeply problematic to 
most participants of the CI-debate, with the few prominent exceptions of Gilbert and Pettit, 
and his co-authors.24 Obviously, even the firmly anti-individualist relationalists (Schmid and 
Meijer) explicitly reject subject anti-individualism.  
                                                
22 The concept of a ‘social integrate’ is owed to Pettit 2003; for more on this, see below . 
23 This important distinction is introduced in Schmid 2005, 189, 226ff. and 2009, 34–44, 116; cf., critical of a 
subjective anti-individualistic interpretation of Husserl, Chelstrom 2013, 78, 110ff. 
24 Notice that both Gilbert and Pettit (and co-authors) employ a different terminological framework. Accord-
ingly, for Gilbert, the endorsement of both formal and subjective individualism would amount to what she 
labels “singularism” and which, to be sure, she rejects (cf. Gilbert 1989, esp. 12f.); Pettit & Co., in turn, would 
label the position at issue not anti-individualism (see Pettit’s construal of the claim that our individual inten-
tional psychologies are, in some way or another, compromised by social regularities, whereas this, in my termi-
nology, amounts to collectivism), but, rather, similar to Gilbert, “anti-singularism” (cf. esp. Pettit 1993 and 
Pettit/Schweikard 2006).  
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 Here, then, we see how markedly Husserl’s alternative theory of CI contrasts with most 
of the current proposals. Yet, is formal-cum-subject anti-individualism not precisely too strong 
of an alternative?  
 
4. Two Objections: Content/Vehicle-Fallacy and Collective Consciousness  
 
At this point, some may wonder whether Husserl is not at risk of committing a sort of vehi-
cle/content-type fallacy. In the present context, the fallacy would be to infer from the joint-
ness of the content or mode of CI the existence of one—potentially supra-individual and/or 
emergent—vehicle or bearer of those we-intentions (e.g., a HOP or similar). This objection 
may also be voiced in terms of a fallacy of composition, or a homuncular fallacy (cf. Chel-
strom 2013, 30, 58). In a similar yet more serious line of objection, Schmid has argued that 
Husserl would simply take over his egological categories and project them onto higher order 
entities. By evoking some higher order collectivities, mapped onto the structure of their lower 
order constituents (transcendental egos), Husserl would, somewhat ironically, be at fault on 
ground of both methodological individualism/solipsism and of a dubious sort of collectivism 
(Schmid 2000, 17–27).25 Furthermore, a second, related concern might be that Husserl, at a 
number of places (see below), suggests that HOPs have a subjectivity of their own, and, what 
is more, that he attributes conscious and even self-conscious properties to them. The common 
charge in both objections is that, by postulating a collective subjectivity with a consciousness 
of its own, one would reify intersubjective relations. Another way to square these two objec-
tions is nicely put by Pettit’s criticism of the Hegelian notion of Volksgeist, or a Durkheimian 
collective consciousness. According to Pettit, “there is a notorious ambiguity in any such no-
tion, for it may refer to a people’s thinking or mind as well as to a people’s thought: to a col-
lective state or medium of consciousness as well as to a collective content” (Pettit 1993, 168). 
 However seriously we must take this double objection, (and all the more so, since I 
believe that no account of group personhood or group mindedness can sensibly accommo-
date any sort of properly speaking ‘collective (self-)consciousness’ (cf. Szanto 2014a)), I con-
tend that these objections are ultimately misguided. In particular, Husserl’s multi-layered ‘social 
integrate’ (Pettit 2003) account of HOPs should be construed as a ‘non-entity’, or even as a 
‘no-ownership view’ of group persons, which allows him to undermine the force of theses 
objections.  
 As to the first, ‘projectionist’ objection, consider the following two requirements, which 
any adequate theory of plural or collective subjects (CS) must at least fulfill, be they spelled 
out as group agents, group persons or group minds, all concepts that Husserl himself em-
ploys: 
 
(1) Plurality Requirement: CSs, qua collective subjects, must be construed so as to account for 
the fact that they ‘comprise’ a collective or a plurality of individuals (which also allows for 
a certain ‘intentional variation’ in their mental life).26 
                                                
25 Note that collectivism, here, is not tantamount to some version of intentional or normative collectivism (cf. 
Pettit 1993 and Szanto forthcoming a), but to the more specific claim of collectivizing subjects of CI. 
26 Different formulations of this requirement can be found in Gilbert 1989, Mathiesen 2005 and Chelstrom 
2013. 
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(2) Integrity Requirement: CSs, qua collective subjects, must be construed so as to account for 
the fact that they are not just a simple collection, aggregate or plurality of individuals, 
but have a certain integrity as a subjectivity with its own intentional point of view. 
 
How can Husserl’s theory of HOP accommodate both requirements? To start with, it is cru-
cial to note that the process of intentional communalization outlined above constitutes dis-
tinct types of subjects of collective intentions. Though Husserl, admittedly, fails to provide a 
systematic taxonomy of the variety of subjects of CI, one can devise the following four main 
types of social subjectivities: a.) “communicative, integrated personal pluralities” (kommunika-
tive, verbundene Personenvielheit), b.) “practical communities of will’ (praktische Willensgemeinschaft), 
c.) “supra-personal subjectivities” (überpersonale Subjektivitäten), and d.) full-blown “higher or-
der persons” (Personen höherer Ordnung), or the infamous ‘communal minds’ (Gemeingeist) (Hua 
XIV, 169, 197, 200f.).27 Whether we have instances of one or another type of collective de-
pends, essentially, on how ‘deep’ the process of communalization into the intentional life of 
the respective individuals (as to their affective, cognitive, normative, etc. properties) reaches 
and how robust the intentional integration is. For example, a HOP (d.) can only be instantiat-
ed in “distinct cases” of communal volition and action (Hua XIV, 205, 219f.) and not on the 
purely experiential or communicative domain, however much they may be integrated. 
 Now, this multi-layered account of the subject(s) of CI is a further, majorly important 
advantage of Husserl’s account over standard current models,28 for it captures, above and 
beyond the distinction between intersubjective, social, communal and collective intentionality, 
the most salient phenomenological differences between various types of communalization 
within the domain of CI. This multi-layered feature is also encapsulated in the very concept 
of ‘higher order.’ Without there being a sort of teleological hierarchy of collective agents, 
Husserl’s theory of foundation equips us with all necessary resources for the analysis of the 
gradual evolvement of ever more complex and, at the same time, ever more integrated social 
entities.29  
 Thus, there is a crucial distinction between various types of intentional integration of 
subjects of CI according to the levels of social communalization (Stufen der sozialen Vereinigung). 
In fact, theses levels of integration, in terms of their intentional subject-‘poles,’ roughly corre-
spond to the distinction between intersubjective, social and collective intentionality. We can 
discern three such types of social subject-poles: (i.) essentially empathy-based intersubjectivity 
with “non-integrated individual subject-poles” (vereinzelte/isolierte Pole von Individuen), (ii.) mul-
                                                
27 As to Husserl’s cautioning against collectivistic misuses of these concepts, it is interesting to note that, while 
he continued to use the term higher order persons after Hitler’s takeover in 1933, he explicitly rejected the term 
Gemeingeist and those with similar connotations as “mysticism” and “mythology”; see Caminada 2011, 60 and 
Husserl’s manuscript K III 1, p. 9 (quoted in Toulemont 1962, 177). At any rate, the more fine-grained seman-
tics of Husserl’s use of the concept of supra-individual social entities, as well as the examples that Husserl gives 
in support of them, is vertiginously complex. He uses whole series of interrelated conception, acknowledging at 
one point that he would “name everything mixed together” (Hua XIV, 220); see, critically, Schmid 2001, 17ff.; 
see, relatedly, also Szanto forthcoming a. 
28 Cf., however, a similar but slightly different distinction recently put forth by Helm (2008), namely, between 
“plural intentional systems,” i.e., merely instrumental, goal-directed collectives, and “plural robust agents,” i.e., 
the “subjects of import,” the latter entailing a “shared evaluative perspective,” and also shared emotions. 
29 For a concise discussion of the sense of ‘higher’ in the concept of higher order persons, see Allen 1978, 75. 
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tipolar (communicative) communities, which may constitute more or less robust, proper “sys-
tems of poles” (Polsysteme) and, finally, the domain of communities, such as “love” or “ethical 
communities,”30 with habitualized and robustly synthesized subject-poles (Polsynthese) (Husserl 
1923, esp. 218ff.; cf. also Hua XIV, 173ff.).31 
 Secondly, one should not loose sight of the fact that the relation between individuals 
and higher order persons is a foundational one, and that it is not a relation between individu-
als but, rather, between complexities or collections of individuals. Individuals and HOPs do 
not relate to one another as individuals relate to other individuals. Accordingly, it is a set, or 
better, a multiplicity of persons (Personenvielfalt) that is the foundational “substratum” of high-
er order persons (Hua XIV, 200f.; cf. Hart 1992, 256f.). Thus, even though there is a robust 
unity to such multiplicities, such that HOPs can be said to synthesize their individual mem-
bers, the relation between them is not a simple mereological containment, for the individuals 
remain distinct, or separate, in two ways: first, they are individually distinct from one another 
and never simply ‘fuse’ intentionally into one another when they partake in the same (supra-
individual) mental life;32 secondly, the personhood of individuals remain individuated by 
themselves, i.e., they continue to be, even if “unified” (geeinigt), “individual persons” (Hua 
XIV, 202). And, precisely in that sense, individuals always remain distinct and independent 
from any supra-individual subjectivity. As Husserl succinctly puts it: “[Communal subjectivi-
ty] is a many-headed unified subjectivity” (Hua XIV, 220; cf. also 218).  
 Moreover, intentional implication and integration, for Husserl, never amounts to some-
thing like intentional, let alone ‘real’ (reell), fusion. Quite the contrary, in an anti-collectivist 
vein Husserl, emphasizes the fact that intentional integration is not only strictly compatible 
with plurality and separateness of the mental and personal life of the respective individuals, 
but, moreover, that this very separateness is itself the transcendental condition of possibility 
of any social integration (cf. also Zahavi 2001, 75ff.): 
 
“In a certain sense, the individuality of souls (Seelen) means an unbridgeable separation – thus a 
being-different-than-the-other (Anders-Sein) and a being-external-to-one-another (Auseinander-
Sein) (in a logical not a spatial sense), which can never develop into a continuous connection, 
into a connection that would be a continuous flowing-into-one-another (Ineinanderfließen) (…). 
On the other hand, this separation does not preclude that the monads ‘coincide’ (sich ‘decken’), 
in other words, it does not prevent them from being able to be in community with one anoth-
er, and indeed, this separation is the condition of possibility of such [coincidence and commu-
nity].” (Hua XV, 335) 
 
Yet, however distinct and however multiple, the concept of socio-practical integration must 
be taken literally. As already noted, Husserl is very explicit that higher order collectives are 
not simple aggregates, but “social unities” in the full sense. More specifically, HOPs “consti-
                                                
30 To some readers, Husserl’s phenomenology of sociality may sound all too harmonious, as if the “commerce” 
of individuals (Hua XIV, 124) would not allow for dissent or worse. None of the above, however, precludes 
such. Quite the contrary, Husserl notes that dispute, hatred, fights, etc., essentially belong to and take place 
within the very process of communalization, cf. Hua Mat VIII, 334; XXXIX, 396; Husserl 1923, 209. 
31 See also the congenial discussion of the Husserlian distinction between “simple intersubjectivity” (simple 
intersubjectivité), “pole-systems” (système de pôles) and “pole-synthesis” (synthèse de pôles) in Toulemont 1962, 311f. 
32 Cf. also the famous passage in the Crisis (and this passage, ironically, has been often criticized as evidencing 
transcendental solipsism), wherein Husserl unmistakably states that “the primal I (Ur-Ich) (…) can never lose its 
uniqueness and personal indeclinability” (Undeklinierbarkeit)” (Hua VI, 188). 
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tute not merely collections of social subjectivities, but coalesce into (schließen sich zusammen zu) a 
social subjectivity, inwardly organized to a greater or lesser degree, which has its common 
opposition pole (gemeinsames Gegenüber) in a surrounding world, or an external world, i.e. a 
world which is for her” (Hua IV, 196). If this is the case, then the multipolar, “many-headed,” 
or “headless,” social subjectivities integrate so as to become a unitary, yet higher order 
agent.33 
 Consider, however, that Husserl nowhere treats social integrates as some kind of sub-
stantial super-entities. Rather, they are functional and intentional poles of actions, thoughts, 
intentions, or values. In this respect, even if we have an instance of a we-mode synthesis of 
poles with a respective “synthesized personality” (Husserl 1923, 220), there is not an extra 
‘owner’ of such poles (be it a supra-individual one) above and beyond the very social inte-
grate of individuals. “Common minds” are, as Husserl points out, “not something besides 
[the minds of a plurality of bodies, standing in physical relationships, something required for 
intercommerce], but an encompassing ‘sense’ (‘Sinn’) or ‘mind’, [an] objectivity of a higher 
level]” (Hua IV, 243). Again, this encompassing, or shared sense is not constituted by an ex-
tra-entity, over and above the individuals engaged, but precisely by the integration of each 
and every individual’s first-person point of view into a first-person plural point of view. 
 Indeed, we find further ammunition for this interpretation in Husserl when he observes 
that HOPs are different, not only from mere intersubjective engagements in social acts, but 
also from multipolar communities, where individual members are each separately focused on 
a shared goal. In contrast, HOPs have their own pole of intentionality, analogous to the ego-
centred individuals, and, thus, are so-called “centred communities”:  
 
“The I-centeredness (Ich-Zentrierung) that is proper to each individual subject, can have, but has 
not necessarily a real analogue in the communalized intersubjectivity. One may speak of a social 
personality only if we can speak of a sort of I-centeredness vis-à-vis the individual subjects and 
of a persisting habituality (verharrende Habitualität) of the centred community (zentrierte Gemein-
schaft).” (Hua XIV, 405). 
 
This very view, I contend, is an avant la lettre-formulation of an ingenious proposal in con-
temporary social ontology, namely, Carol Rovane’s account of group persons and Philip Pet-
tit’s account of groups with minds of their own. The basic idea here is that group persons and 
agents are epistemologically distinct from their members, upon whom they, nonetheless, on-
tologically supervene insofar as they have their own ‘rationally unified point of view’ (Rovane 
1998; Pettit 2003), their own ‘intentional profile’ (Pettit/Schweikard 2006) or ‘vision’ 
(List/Pettit 2011, 34). Importantly, this point of view may be epistemologically orthogonal 
and is, in any case, irreducible to each and every first-person point of view of the respective 
group members (cf. more detailed Szanto 2014a). 
                                                
33 See Hua XXVII, 22: “Community is a personal, many-headed, as it were, and yet integrated (verbundene) sub-
jectivity. Their individual subjects are ‘members’ (‚Glieder’), functionally interwoven (funktionell miteinander verfloch-
ten) through various mentally unifying ‘social acts’ (I-Thou-acts, orders, agreements, activities of love, etc.), 
which link person to person. Occasionally, a community functions as a many-headed and yet in a higher sense 
‘headless’: to wit, without being centered upon a unity of a subject of volition and acting analogously to an 
individual subject. However, it may also assume this higher form of life and become a ‘personality of higher 
order’ and as such perform communal achievements, which are not mere aggregate formations (Zusammenbil-
dungen) of individual-personal achievements, but in the full sense personal achievements of the community as 
such, realized in its striving and willing.” 
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 Now, what about a proper phenomenological point of view? Do groups have such, or are 
groups, instead, individuated exclusively by their rational, practical and intentional point of 
view? In other words, what about the conscious experiences of such centred communities? 
The question is all the more pertinent, given transcendental phenomenology’s systematic 
claim about the constitutive correlation between intentionality and consciousness. For, if eve-
ry intentional state is eo ipso a conscious mental state (cf. Szanto 2012), as this correlation in-
deed entails, one might wonder whether this equally holds for the intentional states of HOPs. 
So, given Husserl’s general theory of the intentionality of consciousness, it seems as if Hus-
serl’s theory of CI would inevitably lead to the arguably untenable (cf. Szanto 2014a), claim 
that there were something like a ‘collective consciousness’.  
 Yet, although Husserl, indeed, speaks of an “all-encompassing communal conscious-
ness” (übergreifenden Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein) (Hua VI, 166) or “a unity of a supra-personal con-
sciousness” (Hua XIV, 199), a “unity of a communal consciousness” (Hua XXVII, 21), and 
even goes so far as to attribute a “capacity of self-reflection,” and a “self-consciousness in the 
proper sense” (Hua XXVII, 49) or a “‘self-consciousness’ of higher order” (Hua XIV, 220), 
surprisingly, he remains rather vague on how to flesh out the conscious and phenomenal 
properties of social entities. However, I contend that Husserl’s scattered remarks allow for 
distilling his general view on the topic and, in particular, for defending it against the charge of 
any dubious construal of collective consciousness.  
 The decisive step down this road is to properly distinguish four different senses in 
which Husserl speaks of social and collective (self-)conscious properties:34  
 (1) First, we have a sort of ‘empathic consciousness,’ wherein individuals can be said to 
directly experience the consciousness of others. This sort of ‘consciousness’ may be controver-
sial on other, independent epistemological grounds, yet amounts to no more and no less than 
what, today, one would call social cognition or knowledge of other minds and is, thus, not a 
true problem of any sort of collectivizing consciousness. 
 (2) Relatedly, we have what Husserl sometimes describes as an “all-encompassing 
communal consciousness” (übergreifendes Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein; Hua VI, 166). This is founded 
on empathic consciousness and corresponds to the above-mentioned we-synthesis, whereby, 
via various intentional implications, each individual is experiencing the other, not simpliciter, 
but as experiencing the same world, i.e. the (objective) “world for us all” (Hua VI, 257ff.). 
Here, we have what Husserl also refers to as the “unification” (Vereinigung) or “coincidence” 
(Deckung) “of one consciousness with another”. Though, significantly, “they necessarily re-
main separated” as “individual consciousnesses” on a higher, properly personal, level; as 
                                                
34 The most sophisticated and critical phenomenological account of the concept of collective consciousness, as 
distinct from “supra-individual stream of experiences” (überindividueller Erlebnisstrom) is provided by Stein 1920, a 
study that was familiar to Husserl; on Stein, see Mulligan’s contribution in this volume, Caminada 2010 and 
Szanto forthcoming b. The only contemporary author, to my knowledge, who argues for the possibility of col-
lective consciousness (and, incidentally, against the conception of group minds), from, indeed, a phenomenolog-
ical perspective, is Mathiesen 2005; however, what she has in mind is that “individual members” of a given 
collective, which complies with the plurality requirement above, “are aware of the contents” of their we-
intentions (Mathiesen 2005, 248). This, Mathiesen’s “awareness condition,” to be sure, is something to which 
Husserl, in fact, subscribes (cf., e.g., Hua XIV, 220f.), but which seems not to amount to any robust conception 
of collective consciousness proper; for a convincing critique of Mathiesen, see Chelstrom 2013, Chaps. 1–2, 
which represent the most thorough discussion of collective consciousness to date. See also Hart 1992, 269 for a 
congenial discussion of the self-consciousness of HOP.  
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such, they can be said to converge into a “unity of supra-personal consciousness” (Einheit des 
überpersonalen Bewusstsein) (Hua XIV, 199; cf. VI, 166f.). From the context of the respective 
passages, then, it is rather clear that what is meant by these forms of consciousness is but a 
transcendental correlate of the intersubjective horizon of possible experiences of a universally 
shared lifeworld. True, Husserl sometimes, misleadingly enough, characterizes this coales-
cence as an integration into “a united stream of consciousness” (geeinigt zu einem Bewusstseins-
strom) (Hua XIV, 202f.). However, this should not lead one astray, for this “interrelation of 
consciousnesses” (Bewusstseinszusammenhang) (ibid., 200ff., 218) simply means that there is an 
intentional arguably of (shared) sense, just as there is on the level of individual consciousness 
(cf. ibid., 279).  
 (3) Next, there is a relatively innocuous sense of ‘social consciousness,’ which desig-
nates not a phenomenological consciousness proper, but, rather, a form of ‘social identity,’ a 
‘sense of membership’ or ‘belonging,’ together with the correlative ‘sense of duty’ with re-
spect to the traditions, values, etc.35 Husserl’s use of such terms as “family” or “clan con-
sciousness” (Familienbewusstsein, Stammesbewusstsein) (Hua XIII, 109) evokes this denotation, 
too. Incidentally, this roughly approximates the sense in which Durkheim first introduces the 
term ‘collective consciousness’, as the totality of common beliefs, values, etc. of the average 
members of a given community (Durkheim 1893/1922, 35ff.).  
 (4) Finally, and certainly most controversially, Husserl occasionally, and sometimes, 
indeed, in the very same passages concerning the other senses, most especially the second as 
enumerated above, invokes the notion of a sui generis higher-order (self-)consciousness (Hua 
XIV, 220; XXVII, 49). However, this ought not to delude us, for Husserl hastens to add to 
the same passages that all conscious acts of the community are founded upon and performed, 
qua acts of consciousness, by the acts of the respective individual members (Hua XXVII, 49). 
Moreover, from the context of these two passages, it is quite clear that what happens when 
HOPs are said to have self-consciousness is not simply that either some or all members be-
come conscious of themselves being members of the given HOP, including any subsequent 
awareness of the normative and ethical obligations that this membership entails. In other 
words, acts of (self-)reflection of individual members may be communalized in the sense of 
individuals’ self-reflective acts having a communal content, or being performed in the we-
mode (by individuals, to be sure). For example, somebody may perform self-reflection as a 
group member, i.e. in we-mode, by asking herself, “Are we right in believing this?” This, how-
ever, is nothing more than a sort of communal manifestation of individual subjects’ self-
reflective contents, namely, by virtue of those individuals performing full-fledged we-mode 
acts of self-consciousness (cf. Allen 1978). Concerning any alleged self-consciousness of 
HOPs ‘themselves,’ the passages under consideration evoke nothing other than a kind of 
ethical or normative ‘stocktaking,’ ‘self-assessment’ or ‘self-determination’ of its own rational 
point of view (Selbstwertung, Selbstgestaltung; Hua XXVII, 49). It is not, in any particularly com-
pelling sense, some “pre-reflective plural self-awareness” (Schmid 2014; cf. Szanto 2014a). 
 To sum up, in none of these four senses of ‘collective (self-)consciousness’ do we have 
an instance of phenomenological (properly speaking) consciousness or self-awareness. Not-
withstanding either some misleading formulations or the fact that Husserl fails to systemati-
                                                
35 Notice, however, that Husserl sometimes speaks of “social consciousness” (soziales Bewusstsein), not in this 
Durkheimian, but, rather, in the sense of what I list in (4.), cf., e.g., Hua XIV, 206. 
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cally disambiguate the intentional, normative, rational and (quasi-)personal features of the 
mental life of communities and the respective concepts of higher order group persons, group 
minds, and collective and social consciousness, one does not detect, in Husserl, any genuinely 
problematic form of hypostasizing a collective bearer of consciousness or a giving way to the 
tendency of reifying conscious properties on the collective level.  
 
Conclusion 
 
If my systematic reading is fair, I hope to have established that Husserl has, above and be-
yond his theory of empathy, intersubjectivity and his social ontology, an avant la lettre theory 
of collective intentionality. However unsystematic and admittedly half-baked at some 
junctures, Husserl’s account of CI foreshadowes all the relevant issues that, decades later, 
would be discussed in extenso in the analytic debates. Now, this fact alone, however unfamil-
iar it may be to most, does not make much of a difference, to be sure. What, then, do we gain 
from the specific Husserlian account? I wish to have shown that Husserl’s account of CI has 
a number of advantages over current proposals, pointing to a more adequate understanding 
of the constitution and the structure of social reality.  
 Let us take stock of what I take to be the five key merits of the Husserlian account: (1) 
First, Husserl is, contrary to some critical commentators and in contrast to the virtually all 
current work in social ontology, adamant that social reality, at no level, is composed of pre-
social atoms but, rather, of ab ovo socialized individuals. (2) Secondly, this very starting point 
allows Husserl to devise a more complex and adequate theory of the constitutional and foun-
dational layers of the process of socialization and communalization of individuals than what 
obtains in mainstream analytic social ontology. Verily, such a theory accounts for the fact that 
the socialization of individuals—i.e., their entering and entertaining intersubjective and social 
relations—and their communalization—i.e., their entering and entertaining collectives of vari-
ous levels of integration—are but two aspects of the complex process of the constitution of 
an essentially common lifeworld. Moreover, Husserlian phenomenology allows for a fully-
fledged ‘intentionalist’ description of communalization, a program often pointed to (e.g. by 
Gilbert 1989) but little expounded upon in contemporary social ontology. Thus, Husserl of-
fers a more fine-grained description of the constitution of sociality, both on the (inter-
)subjective, as well as the collective level. Furthermore, such a description is not carried out 
from an external point of view (pace Mathiesen 2005, 242) in terms of some observable socio-
ontological functions, structures or systems but, instead, from the first-person singular and 
plural perspective of the respective individuals and groups. (3) Accordingly, just as it does so 
in differentiating between intersubjective, social, communal, and collective intentionality, 
Husserlian phenomenology emphasizes, as a crucial addendum to contemporary models, the 
heterogeneous nature and multi-layered structure of social relations and collectives. (4) Re-
garding the nature and structure of collective intentionality proper, Husserl suggests, even if 
only in nuce, a highly original alternative to contemporary, predominate accounts of the same. 
This alternative yields a robust formal-cum-subject anti-individualism. It undercuts the need 
for deciding between tying in collectivity with either the subject, the mode, or the content of 
collective intentionality. Moreover, it renders dissuasive the circularity objection regarding the 
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question of a foundational priority of collectivity over individual (we-)intentions. (5) Lastly, 
concerning the subject(s) of CI, a significant benefit of the Husserlian account is to offer, 
once again, a multi-layered account, thereby putting the subject of CI in its respective place, 
depending, essentially, on how deep the process of communalization into the intentional life 
of the respective individuals reaches (their affective, cognitive, normative, etc. properties). Of 
course, this, in turn, rests on those mechanisms through which such integration and commu-
nalization are achieved, as well as on how robust the social integration is. Finally, this multi-
dimensional model of the respective subjects of CI helps Husserl to vindicate intentional an-
ti-collectivism and, also, to block the alluring but erroneous tendency to reify subjectivity on 
the group level. 
 Overall, then, Husserl’s theory of collective intentionality suggests a number of original 
solutions to the most salient problems and shortcomings of current accounts, and is, 
ultimately, better geared to handle the notorious complexities of social reality.  
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